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In this brief contribution I turn to Kostakopoulou’s text and briefly show that her
proposal: 1) ignores the core aspects of EU citizenship’s added value; 2) is entirely
unnecessary; 3) is not legally neat; and 4) is dangerous for the very nature of EU
citizenship today as it essentially pleads for the recreation of the ‘suffocating bonds’
the EU was created to ease, only at a scale much more scary than Greece, Ireland
or France, when taken one by one. Besides, it ignores every single outstanding
problem actually posed by EU citizenship law as it stands.
Ignoring the main value of EU citizenship
Kostakopoulou’s proposal strikes me as empty: unnecessary, not worked out, and
potentially harmful. I thus join the majority of other commentators in feeling obliged to
dismiss it. Its underlying aim, even if not directly stated, emerges as the replication of
the suffocating bonds at the supranational level in a Union that was created with one
core idea in mind: to tone down liberal nationalisms and make the individual emerge
as a beneficiary of rights deriving directly from EU law, more than a hostage of the
polities distributing the statuses of belonging.1)W. Kymlicka, “Liberal Nationalism and
Cosmopolitan Justice”, in S. Benhabib, Another Cosmopolitanism (Oxford, 2006),
134.  The core aspect of EU citizenship is that it is the natural enemy number one of
the nationalities of the Member States, in that it simply switches them off within the
scope of application of EU law as a result of the application of non-discrimination on
the basis of nationality. It turns Member States’ aspirations to control the composition
of their populations – a right any other sovereign state claims to enjoy around the
world – into an even bigger fiction, since free movement across the Union borders is
a directly enforceable right. Even more, although derivative from the Member States’
nationalities, EU citizenship, in fact, has significant implications for the distribution
and functioning of the national-level statuses: Boukhalfa prohibits discrimination on
the basis of the grounds of acquisition of a nationality, Micheletti prohibits the testing
of the suffocating bonds with other states, and Rottmann outlaws arbitrariness in the
removal of nationality (at least EU-law-significant arbitrariness). The circle is rounded
up: the supranational status already necessarily affects core approaches to the
essence of nationality in the Member States.2)D. Kochenov, “Rounding up the Circle:
The Mutation of Member States’ Nationalities under Pressure from EU Citizenship”,
EUI Working Paper RSCAS No 2010/23, 2010 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1577984&download=yes>. Unlike any status of tying
a person to the imaginary ‘society’ through ‘residence’ (even if a Bangladeshi
naturalizes in a Bangladeshi ghetto in an EU capital) EU citizenship, instead,
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decouples. Indeed, it is the only citizenship in the world with the core directly
enforceable right to leave the state that claims you as a national.3)A. #azowski,
“‘Darling You Are Going Nowhere’: The Right to Exit in EU Law”, 40 ELRev. (2015),
877. It is citizenship that liberates you from the obligation to conform to the linguistic,
cultural, and other clichés and is based, essentially, on difference, elevated to a
sacred right.
This is only possible due to the fundamental decoupling of the competence to
distribute the status, which guarantees both EU citizenship’s fascinating nature of
an empowering ‘anti-citizenship’ of sorts – a protector of the claims to belong based
on the denial of the very rationale behind the need to belong – and, secondly, the
most ironical legal pluralism of access to the status, only possible through essentially
false claims of the Member States of being in control, as I have demonstrated with
Lindeboom.4)D. Kochenov and J. Lindeboom, “Pluralism through Its Denial: The
Success of EU Citizenship”, M. Avbelj and G. Davies (eds), Handbook on Legal
Pluralism in the EU (Edward Elgar, 2018) <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3099099>. Both these aspects are fundamentally precious and both are
overlooked and potentially undermined by Kostakopoulou’s suggestions. Once able
to confer its own status, the EU will be bound to make the clichés of EU citizenship
explicit – and Kostakopoulou already suggests ‘residence’ – damaging the status
and depriving it of the core added value.
Offering to solve no problem
Kostakopoulou mentions several potential vulnerable groups to benefit from a direct
conferral of EU citizenship, some of them real, but the majority imaginary, and fails
to explain why the decoupling of EU citizenship and Member State nationality would
at all be necessary. Fighting statelessness is not an argument, since the EU is
not a state and anyone with an EU citizenship will remain stateless. Ensuring that
children of EU citizens exercising free movement do not end up without a nationality
is not an argument either, since EU law will have to step in – à la Rottmann –
prohibiting Member States from punishing the children of those who exercise
their main citizenship right, an example Gerard-René de Groot and many other
colleagues discussed in detail since the times of Maastricht.5)G.-R. de Groot,
“Towards European Nationality Law”, 8 Electronic Journal of Comparative Law
(2004) <https://www.ejcl.org/83/art83-4.html>.Brexit is a wrong pretext too: tying
British people to the EU ignoring the sovereign decision of their Member State
taken democratically smells like tyranny, as I explain with van den Brink in detail
in a forthcoming JCMS article.6)M. van den Brink and D. Kochenov, “Against
Associate EU Citizenship”, 57 JCMS (2019, forthcoming) <draft available: https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3175318>.
Lastly, the third country nationals who reside in the EU for long enough a time could
objectively benefit from a significant improvement of their status. In disagreement
with Acosta Arcarazo, I submit that the relevant Directive failed to establish a
status similar in any way to EU citizenship.7)D. Acosta Arcarazo, “Civic Citizenship
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Reintroduced?”, 21 ELJ (2015), 200. It is not this failure, however, which is a
problem – after all, not so much depends on this legal status per se, as Thym rightly
underlines in his contribution – but the fact that unlike any other constitutional system
in the world, the EU does not even pretend to offer its law and the opportunities
of the internal market to the majority of third-country nationals, who are confined
to individual states.8)D. Kochenov and M. van den Brink, “Pretending There Is No
Union: Non-Derivative Quasi-Citizenship Rights of Third-Country Nationals in the
EU”, in D. Thym and M. Zoetewij Turhan (eds), Degrees of Free Movement and
Citizenship (Martinus Nijhoff, 2015), 66. Solving the problem of opening up the
internal market to third-country nationals is a matter of amending the Directive,
however – no complete reshuffling of the Treaties will be needed for this. The
proposal uses an impossible sledgehammer to crack a microscopic nut. As we have
seen, the absolute majority of the problems it purports to solve are imaginary, while
the last remaining one does not require, per se, a separate supranational citizenship
solution. Thinking about Europe’s future, one could be inspired by Paul-Henri Spaak
in charting the paths for change: idealistic reforms leading nowhere, however well-
intentioned, can – and shall – harm the cause of European integration. Solution to no
problem, Kostakopoulou’s submission is in this category.
Failing to rely on the law as it stands
It is very good that Kostakopoulou does not explain how to put the unnecessary
proposal in practice, since the answer, quite obviously, is that it is impossible without
amending the Treaties. Sarmiento has most recently explained in great detail why
the EU is not empowered to regulate the main bulk of nationality-related matters,
including the introduction of the status.9)D. Sarmiento, “EU Competence and the
Attribution of Nationality in the Member States”, Investment Migration Research
Papers no. 2019/2, 2019 <https://investmentmigration.org/download/eu-competence-
attribution-nationality-member-states-imc-rp-2019-2>. In essence, given that the
need for the proposed change is not explained to us and the mechanisms are left out
in the open, it would be difficult to agree, at the bottom line, that there is a proposal
at all. Nothing legally doable is proposed for no reason at all. The picture is a bit
more complicated than that, however, as the ‘proposal’ is bound to contradict the
Treaties quite a bit even beyond the main ius tractum rationale of the independent
supranational status.10)D. Kochenov, “Ius Tractum of Many Faces”, 15 CJEL (2009),
169 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1352734>. This is due to
the fact that an independent supranational status is inescapably but the first step to
an outright replacement of the Member States’ nationalities: spill-over logic ensures
that if the Union can bite off a finger, it will. Put otherwise, what is suggested – in
the medium-term run – is the abolition of the Member States and, thus depriving the
project of EU integration of added value – there is no interest in benefitting from free
movement if what you find on the other side of the border is the same as at home.
And without citizenship not much is left of states of course.
Ignoring the federal bargain, analyzed by Nic Shuibhne so well, is deeply
problematic.11)N. Nic Shuibhne, “Recasting EU Citizenship as Federal Citizenship”,
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in D. Kochenov (ed.), EU Citizenship and Federalism (Cambridge, 2017), 147.
[The ‘proposal’ is not merely insensitive to the current division of competences in
the citizenship field. It is entirely silent on all the law at play. Silence is not a wise
approach, with respect, should the crowd targeted by preaching not be composed
uniquely of those already converted.
At issue, ultimately, is the Member States’ ability to regulate, full stop. I am not a
proponent of the wholly internal situations as currently construed.12)A. Tryfonidou,
Reverse Discrimination in EC Law (Kluwer Law International, 2009). They are,
however, the law of the land as it stands. Consequently, the implications of the
separation between the nationalities of the Member States and EU citizenship
for this aspect of EU law have to be considered. This is important, in particular,
since only the nationalities of the Member States in combination with no cross-
border element can result in a situation where national law, rather than EU law
available on the issue, applies. I have claimed that this is one of the core legally-
significant aspects of Member State nationalities in the current EU: they allow states
to lawfully mistreat (treating better would be prohibited by EU law) huge chunks
of people.13)Kochenov, “Rounding up”, op. cit. The absence of local nationality
means, presumably, the absence of wholly internal situations for that person, which
automatically shifts the main bulk of the law applicable to the situation of ‘pure’ EU
citizens to the supranational register, turning national law into a redundancy. One
might be happy about this, but cannot be happy silently: visceral opposition of the
Masters of the Treaties is to be expected. More supranational regulation is not a
problem per se, besides the fact that when the difference in regulation is lost, some
Europeans will feel that their state, which is already prohibited from treating them
better than EU foreigners in many vital aspects of life – represents them even less.
The EU lacking its own territory properly speaking (going beyond the sum of the
territories of the Member States as per Article 52 TEU) will be obliged to assign
the ‘pure Europeans’ to particular state anyway, should they enjoy any right of
residence. Given that an absolute right to reside does not exist and free movement is
subject to legal limitations that have to be respected,14)D. Carter and M. Jesse, “‘The
Dano Evolution’: Assessing Legal Integration and Access to Social Benefits for EU
Citizens”, 4 European Papers (2018). what is likely to emerge is a quasi-nationality
of a Member State anyway. Given that the Member States will not accept that their
own nationals are subjected to more limitations in the EU that the nationals of no
Member State as per the ‘proposal’, ‘pure Europeans’ will either never emerge in
practice, or be treated as markedly second rate inhabitants of the EU. Even worse,
of course, is that they will be stateless in the eyes of the rest of the world, unless
Kostakopoulou has a plan to negotiate the acceptance of this status by Putin and
Trump administrations (among almost 200 others), giving necessary concessions for
the requested gestures of good will.
Ignoring all real problems
What is a pity, is that the ‘proposal’ does not engage with the core problems of
EU citizenship, some of which have been outlined by Kostakopoulou in her earlier
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work. It is a problem that EU citizens can become unwelcome, when they belong
to minorities and are destitute, like Miss Dano;15)D. Schiek, “Perspectives on
Social Citizenship in the EU”, in D. Kochenov (ed.), EU Citizenship and Federalism
(Cambridge, 2017) 341. it is a problem when EU citizens become de facto
foreigners when they commit a crime, however non-dangerous for the society;16)D.
Kostakopoulou, “When EU Citizens Become Foreigners”, 20 ELJ (2014), 447. it
is a problem that the rules of the delimitation of the scopes of the law are based
on personal histories of employment and cross-border movement and are thus
purely personalised and neo-Mediaeval, instead of being rooted in the equality
before the law based on the status of EU citizenship as such;17)D. Kochenov, “Neo-
Mediaeval Permutations of Personhood in the European Union”, in L. Azoulai, S.
Barbou des Places and E. Pataut (eds), Constructing the Person: Rights, Roles,
Identities in EU Law (Hart, 2016), 133 < https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2760968>. it is a problem that fundamental rights seem to be not part of
the EU citizenship package in all cases; it is, finally, a problem that the EU emerges
as a powerful actor of injustice in the eyes of thousands of those who are let down
by its law.18)C. O’Brien, Unity in Adversity (Hart, 2017). The arcane legalistic
explanations why the law is what it is do not save the situation. It is a problem that
some of the core assumptions underlying Union law are not based on any ethical or
moral imperative – that EU law is ‘the law of taking a bus’,19)D. Kochenov, “On Tiles
and Pillars: EU Citizenship as a Federal Denominator in Europe”, in D. Kochenov
(ed.), EU Citizenship and Federalism (Cambridge, 2017) 3 <https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2963861>. where your employability or willingness to
travel activates the protection of rights, not a fundamental legal status as such. All
these core issues are not touched upon either by Bellamy or Kostakopoulou when
discussing the possible innovations so huge, that they are virtually impossible. The
whole conversation emerges as sterile in that it does not mention a single significant
socio-legal problem that the EU and its citizenship happen to be facing.
A ‘proposal’ coming down to an æsthetically-
displeasing word?
All in all, the ‘proposal’ tells us that EU citizenship separated from the nationalities
is something new, while potentially replicating precisely what the EU was needed
to liberate the Member States’ citizens from. It is about ‘suffocating bonds’: more of
those and now in scale. It is thus good news that these are both unnecessary, since
they will not solve any problems, as we have seen – and pretty much impossible,
legally speaking, while steering clear of all the core problems of EU citizenship law.
In essence, what has been proposed comes down to an unutterable word, which I
will not replicate here. Much more could be expected of ‘courageous proposals’: we
clearly do not need this word.
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